<?xml version='1.0'encoding='utf-8'?>encoding='UTF-8'?> <!-- draft submitted in xml v3 --> <!DOCTYPE rfc [ <!ENTITY nbsp " "> <!ENTITY zwsp "​"> <!ENTITY nbhy "‑"> <!ENTITY wj "⁠"> ]><?rfc toc="yes"?> <?rfc symrefs="yes"?> <?rfc sortrefs="yes" ?> <?rfc compact="yes"?> <?rfc subcompact="no"?> <?rfc linkmailto="no" ?> <?rfc editing="no" ?> <?rfc comments="yes" ?> <?rfc inline="yes"?> <?rfc rfcedstyle="yes"?> <?rfc-ext allow-markup-in-artwork="yes" ?> <?rfc-ext include-index="no" ?> <!--<?rfc strict="no"?> --><rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-35" number="9642" obsoletes="" updates="" xml:lang="en" tocInclude="true" symRefs="true" sortRefs="true" version="3"><!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.17.4 --><front><title>A<title abbrev="A YANG Data Model for aKeystore and Keystore Operations</title>Keystore">A YANG Data Model for a Keystore</title> <seriesInfoname="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-35"/>name="RFC" value="9642"/> <author initials="K." surname="Watsen" fullname="Kent Watsen"> <organization>Watsen Networks</organization> <address> <email>kent+ietf@watsen.net</email> </address> </author><date/> <area>Operations</area> <workgroup>NETCONF Working Group</workgroup><date month="September" year="2024"/> <area>OPS</area> <workgroup>netconf</workgroup> <abstract> <t>This document presents a YANG module called "ietf-keystore" that enables centralized configuration of both symmetric and asymmetric keys. The secret value for both key types may be encrypted or hidden. Asymmetric keys may be associated with certificates. Notifications are sent when certificates are about to expire.</t> </abstract><note> <name>Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)</name> <t>This draft contains placeholder values that need to be replaced with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.</t> <t>Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in progress. Please apply the following replacements: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <tt>AAAA</tt> --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types</li> <li> <tt>CCCC</tt> --> the assigned RFC value for this draft</li> </ul> <t>Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <tt>2024-03-16</tt> --> the publication date of this draft</li> </ul> <t>The "Relation to other RFCs" section <xref target="collective-effort"/> contains the text "one or more YANG modules" and, later, "modules". This text is sourced from a file in a context where it is unknown how many modules a draft defines. The text is not wrong as is, but it may be improved by stating more directly how many modules are defined.</t> <t>The "Relation to other RFCs" section <xref target="collective-effort"/> contains a self-reference to this draft, along with a corresponding reference in the Appendix. Please replace the self-reference in this section with "This RFC" (or similar) and remove the self-reference in the "Normative/Informative References" section, whichever it is in.</t> <t>Tree-diagrams in this draft may use the '\' line-folding mode defined in RFC 8792. However, nicer-to-the-eye is when the '\\' line-folding mode is used. The AD suggested suggested putting a request here for the RFC Editor to help convert "ugly" '\' folded examples to use the '\\' folding mode. "Help convert" may be interpreted as, identify what looks ugly and ask the authors to make the adjustment.</t> <t>The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication: </t> <ul spacing="normal"> <li> <xref target="change-log"/>. Change Log</li> </ul> </note></front> <middle> <section> <name>Introduction</name> <t>This document presents a YANG 1.1 <xref target="RFC7950"/> module called "ietf-keystore" that enables centralized configuration of both symmetric and asymmetric keys. The secret value for both key types may be encrypted or hidden (see <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>).target="RFC9640"/>). Asymmetric keys may be associated with certificates. Notifications are sent when certificates are about to expire.</t> <t>The "ietf-keystore" module defines many "grouping" statements intended for use by other modules that may import it. For instance, there are groupings that define enabling a key to beeitherconfigured either inline (within the defining data model) or as a reference to a key in the central keystore. </t> <t>Special consideration has been given for servers that have cryptographic hardware, such as aTrusted Platform Moduletrusted platform module (TPM). These servers are unique in that the cryptographic hardware hides the secret key values. Additionally, such hardware is commonly initialized when manufactured to protect a "built-in" asymmetric key for which its public half is conveyed in an identity certificate (e.g., anIDevIDInitial Device Identifier (IDevID) <xref target="Std-802.1AR-2018"/> certificate).Please see <xref target="built-ins"/> to seeSee how built-in keys aresupported.</t>supported in <xref target="built-ins"/>.</t> <t>This document is intended to reflect existing practices that many server implementations support at the time of writing. To simplify implementation, advanced key formats may be selectively implemented.</t> <t>Implementations may utilize operating-system level keystore utilities (e.g., "Keychain Access" on MacOS) and/or cryptographic hardware (e.g., TPMs).</t> <section anchor="collective-effort"> <name>Relation tootherOther RFCs</name> <t>This document presentsone or morea YANGmodulesmodule <xref target="RFC7950"/> thatareis part of a collection of RFCs that work togetherto, ultimately,to ultimately support the configuration of both the clients and servers ofboththeNETCONFNetwork Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) <xref target="RFC6241"/> and RESTCONF <xreftarget="RFC8040"/> protocols.</t>target="RFC8040"/>.</t> <t> The dependency relationship between the primary YANG groupings defined in the various RFCs is presented in thebelow diagram.diagram below. In some cases, adraftdocument may define secondary groupings that introduce dependencies not illustrated in the diagram. The labels in the diagram areashorthandnamenames for the definingRFC.RFCs. The citationreferencereferences for the shorthandname isnames are provided below the diagram.</t> <t>Please note that the arrows in the diagram point from referencer to referenced. For example, the "crypto-types" RFC does not have any dependencies, whilst the "keystore" RFC depends on the "crypto-types" RFC.</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ crypto-types ^ ^ / \ / \ truststore keystore ^ ^ ^ ^ | +---------+ | | | | | | | +------------+ | tcp-client-server | / | | ^ ^ ssh-client-server | | | | ^ tls-client-server | | | ^ ^ http-client-server | | | | | ^ | | | +-----+ +---------+ | | | | | | | | +-----------|--------|--------------+ | | | | | | | | +-----------+ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | netconf-client-server restconf-client-server ]]></artwork> <!-- RFC Editor: is there anyway to flush-left the table in PDF/HTML views? --><table> <name>Label<table align="left"> <name>Labels in Diagram to RFC Mapping</name> <tbody> <tr> <th>Label in Diagram</th> <th>Originating RFC</th> </tr> <tr> <td>crypto-types</td> <td> <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/></td>target="RFC9640"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>truststore</td> <td> <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors"/></td>target="RFC9641"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>keystore</td> <td><xref target="I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore"/></td>RFC 9642</td> </tr> <tr> <td>tcp-client-server</td> <td> <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server"/></td>target="RFC9643"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>ssh-client-server</td> <td> <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server"/></td>target="RFC9644"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>tls-client-server</td> <td> <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server"/></td>target="RFC9645"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>http-client-server</td> <td> <xref target="I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>netconf-client-server</td> <td> <xref target="I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>restconf-client-server</td> <td> <xref target="I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server"/></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </section> <section> <name>Specification Language</name><t>The<t> The key words"MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY","<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and"OPTIONAL""<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as described inBCP 14BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shownhere.</t>here. </t> </section> <section> <name>Terminology</name> <t>The terms "client" and "server" are defined in <xref target="RFC6241"/> and are not redefined here.</t> <t>The term "keystore" is defined in this document as a mechanism that intends to safeguard secrets.</t> <t>Thenomenclaturenomenclatures "<running>" and "<operational>" are defined in <xref target="RFC8342"/>.</t> <t>The sentence fragments "augmented" and "augmented in" are used herein as the past tense verbified form of the "augment" statement defined in <xrefsection="7.17" target="RFC7950"/>.</t>target="RFC7950" sectionFormat="of" section="7.17"/>.</t> <t>The term "key" may be used to mean one of three things in this document: 1) the YANG-defined "asymmetric-key" or "symmetric-key" node defined in this document, 2) the raw key data possessed by the aforementioned key nodes,andor 3) the "key" of a YANG "list" statement. This documentattempts to always qualifyqualifies types '2' and '3'using,using "raw key value" and "YANG list key" where needed. In all other cases, an unqualified "key" refers to a YANG-defined "asymmetric-key" or "symmetric-key" node.</t> </section> <section> <name>Adherence to the NMDA</name> <t>This document is compliant with Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) <xref target="RFC8342"/>. For instance, keys and associated certificates installed during manufacturing (e.g., for an IDevID certificate) are expected to appear in <operational> (see <xref target="built-ins"/>).</t> </section> <section> <name>Conventions</name> <t>Various examples in this document use "BASE64VALUE=" as a placeholder value for binary data that has been base64 encoded (per <xrefsection="9.8" target="RFC7950"/>).target="RFC7950" sectionFormat="of" section="9.8"/>). This placeholder value is used because realbase64 encodedbase64-encoded structures are often many lines long and hence distracting to the example being presented.</t> <t> Various examples in this document use the XML <xref target="W3C.REC-xml-20081126"/> encoding. Other encodings, such as JSON <xref target="RFC8259"/>, could alternatively be used. </t> <t> Various examples in this document contain long lines that may be folded, as described in <xref target="RFC8792"/>. </t> <t>This document uses the adjective "central" to the word "keystore" to refer to the top-level instance of the "keystore-grouping", when the "central-keystore-supported" feature is enabled. Please be aware that consuming YANG modulesMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> instantiate the "keystore-grouping" in other locations. All such other instances are not the "central" instance.</t> </section> </section> <!-- <t>For the trusted-certificates list, Trust Anchor Format <xref target="RFC5914"/> was evaluated and deemed inappropriate due to this document's need to also support pinning. That is, pinning a client-certificate to support NETCONF over TLS client authentication.</t> --> <section> <name>The "ietf-keystore" Module</name> <t>This section defines a YANG 1.1 <xref target="RFC7950"/> module called "ietf-keystore". A high-level overview of the module is provided in <xref target="overview"/>. Examples illustrating the module's use are provided in <xref target="examples"/>. The YANG module itself is defined in <xref target="keystore-yang-module"/>.</t> <section anchor="overview"> <name>Data Model Overview</name> <t>This section provides an overview of the "ietf-keystore" module in terms of its features, typedefs, groupings, and protocol-accessible nodes.</t> <section anchor="features" toc="exclude"> <name>Features</name> <t>The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in the "ietf-keystore" module:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="yangtree"><![CDATA[ Features: +-- central-keystore-supported +-- inline-definitions-supported +-- asymmetric-keys +-- symmetric-keys]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <!--<aside>--> <t>The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not defined in <xref target="RFC8340"/>.</t> <!--</aside>--> </section> <section anchor="typedefs" toc="exclude"> <name>Typedefs</name> <t>The following diagram lists the "typedef" statements defined in the "ietf-keystore" module:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="yangtree"><![CDATA[ Typedefs: leafref +-- central-symmetric-key-ref +-- central-asymmetric-key-ref]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <!--<aside>--> <t>The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not defined in <xref target="RFC8340"/>.</t> <!--</aside>--> <t>Comments:</t> <ul> <li>All the typedefs defined in the "ietf-keystore" module extend the base "leafref" type defined in <xref target="RFC7950"/>.</li> <li>The leafrefs refer to symmetric and asymmetric keys in the centralkeystore,keystore when this module is implemented.</li> <li>These typedefs are provided as an aid to consuming modules that import the "ietf-keystore" module.</li> </ul> </section> <section toc="exclude"> <name>Groupings</name> <t>The "ietf-keystore" module defines the following "grouping" statements:</t> <ul spacing="compact"> <li>encrypted-by-grouping</li> <li>central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping</li> <li>inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping</li> <li>inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping</li> <li>inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping</li> <li>inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping</li> <li>keystore-grouping</li> </ul> <t>Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.</t> <section anchor="encrypted-by-grouping"> <name>The "encrypted-by-grouping" Grouping</name> <t>The following tree diagram <xref target="RFC8340"/> illustrates the "encrypted-by-grouping" grouping:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="yangtree"><![CDATA[ grouping encrypted-by-grouping: +-- (encrypted-by) +--:(central-symmetric-key-ref) | {central-keystore-supported,symmetric-keys}? | +-- symmetric-key-ref? ks:central-symmetric-key-ref +--:(central-asymmetric-key-ref) {central-keystore-supported,asymmetric-keys}? +-- asymmetric-key-ref? ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <t>Comments:</t> <ul> <li>This grouping defines a "choice" statement with options to reference either a symmetric or an asymmetric key configured in the keystore.</li> <li>This grouping is usable only when the keystore module is implemented. Servers defining custom keystore locationsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> augment in alternate "encrypted-by" references to the alternate locations.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping"> <name>The "central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping" Grouping</name> <t>The following tree diagram <xref target="RFC8340"/> illustrates the "central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping" grouping:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="yangtree"><![CDATA[ grouping central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping: +-- asymmetric-key? ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref | {central-keystore-supported,asymmetric-keys}? +-- certificate? leafref]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <t>Comments:</t> <ul> <li>This grouping defines a reference to a certificate in two parts: the first being the name of the asymmetric key the certificate is associated with, and the second being the name of the certificate itself.</li> <li>This grouping is usable only when the keystore module is implemented. Servers defining custom keystore locations can define an alternate grouping for references to the alternate locations.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping"> <name>The "inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" Grouping</name> <t>The following tree diagram <xref target="RFC8340"/> illustrates the "inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" grouping:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="yangtree"><![CDATA[ grouping inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping: +-- (inline-or-keystore) +--:(inline) {inline-definitions-supported}? | +-- inline-definition | +---u ct:symmetric-key-grouping +--:(central-keystore) {central-keystore-supported,symmetric-keys}? +-- central-keystore-reference? ks:central-symmetric-key-ref]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <t>Comments:</t> <ul> <li>The "inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" grouping is provided solely as convenience to consuming modules that wish to offer an option forwhethera symmetric key that is defined either inline or as a reference to a symmetric key in the keystore.</li> <li>A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case" statementsMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to reference a symmetric key in an alternate location.</li> <li>For the "inline-definition" option, the definition uses the "symmetric-key-grouping" grouping discussed in <xrefsection="2.1.4.3" target="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>.</li>target="RFC9640" sectionFormat="of" section="2.1.4.3"/>.</li> <li>For the "central-keystore" option, the "central-keystore-reference" is an instance of the "symmetric-key-ref" discussed in <xref target="typedefs"/>.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping"> <name>The "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" Grouping</name> <t>The following tree diagram <xref target="RFC8340"/> illustrates the "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="yangtree"><![CDATA[ grouping inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping: +-- (inline-or-keystore) +--:(inline) {inline-definitions-supported}? | +-- inline-definition | +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping +--:(central-keystore) {central-keystore-supported,asymmetric-keys}? +-- central-keystore-reference? ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <t>Comments:</t> <ul> <li>The "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping is provided solely as convenience to consuming modules that wish to offer an option forwhetheran asymmetric key that is defined either inline or as a reference to an asymmetric key in the keystore.</li> <li>A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case" statementsMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to reference an asymmetric key in an alternate location.</li> <li>For the "inline-definition" option, the definition uses the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping discussed in <xrefsection="2.1.4.6" target="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>.</li>target="RFC9640" sectionFormat="of" section="2.1.4.6"/>.</li> <li>For the "central-keystore" option, the "central-keystore-reference" is an instance of the "asymmetric-key-ref" typedef discussed in <xref target="typedefs"/>.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping"> <name>The "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" Grouping</name> <t>The following tree diagram <xref target="RFC8340"/> illustrates the "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" grouping:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="yangtree"><![CDATA[ grouping inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping: +-- (inline-or-keystore) +--:(inline) {inline-definitions-supported}? | +-- inline-definition | +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping +--:(central-keystore) {central-keystore-supported,asymmetric-keys}? +-- central-keystore-reference? ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <t>Comments:</t> <ul> <li>The "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" grouping is provided solely as convenience to consuming modules that wish to offer an option forwhetheran asymmetric key that is defined either inline or as a reference to an asymmetric key in the keystore.</li> <li>A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case" statementsMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to reference an asymmetric key in an alternate location.</li> <li>For the "inline-definition" option, the definition uses the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in <xrefsection="2.1.4.12" target="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>.</li>target="RFC9640" sectionFormat="of" section="2.1.4.12"/>.</li> <li>For the "central-keystore" option, the "central-keystore-reference" is an instance of the "asymmetric-key-ref" typedef discussed in <xref target="typedefs"/>.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping"> <name>The "inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" Grouping</name> <t>The following tree diagram <xref target="RFC8340"/> illustrates the "inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" grouping:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="yangtree"><![CDATA[ grouping inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping: +-- (inline-or-keystore) +--:(inline) {inline-definitions-supported}? | +-- inline-definition | +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping +--:(central-keystore) {central-keystore-supported,asymmetric-keys}? +-- central-keystore-reference +---u central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <t>Comments:</t> <ul> <li>The "inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" grouping is provided solely as convenience to consuming modules that wish to offer an option forwhethera symmetric key that is defined either inline or as a reference to a symmetric key in the keystore.</li> <li>A "choice" statement is used to expose the various options. Each option is enabled by a "feature" statement. Additional "case" statementsMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be augmented in if, e.g., there is a need to reference a symmetric key in an alternate location.</li> <li>For the "inline-definition" option, the definition uses the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in <xrefsection="2.1.4.12" target="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>.</li>target="RFC9640" sectionFormat="of" section="2.1.4.12"/>.</li> <li>For the "central-keystore" option, the "central-keystore-reference" uses the "central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping" grouping discussed in <xref target="central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping"/>.</li> </ul> </section> <section anchor="keystore-grouping"> <name>The "keystore-grouping" Grouping</name> <t>The following tree diagram <xref target="RFC8340"/> illustrates the "keystore-grouping" grouping:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="yangtree"><![CDATA[ grouping keystore-grouping: +-- asymmetric-keys {asymmetric-keys}? | +-- asymmetric-key* [name] | +--name?name string | +---u ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping +-- symmetric-keys {symmetric-keys}? +-- symmetric-key* [name] +--name?name string +---u ct:symmetric-key-grouping]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <t>Comments:</t> <ul> <li>The "keystore-grouping" grouping defines a keystore instance as being composed of symmetric and asymmetric keys. The structure for the symmetric and asymmetric keys is essentially thesame, beingsame: a "list" inside a "container".</li> <li>For asymmetric keys, each "asymmetric-key" uses the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping discussed in <xrefsection="2.1.4.12" target="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>.</li>target="RFC9640" sectionFormat="of" section="2.1.4.12"/>.</li> <li>For symmetric keys, each "symmetric-key" uses the "symmetric-key-grouping" grouping discussed in <xrefsection="2.1.4.3" target="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>.</li>target="RFC9640" sectionFormat="of" section="2.1.4.3"/>.</li> </ul> </section> </section> <section anchor="proto-access-nodes" toc="exclude"><name>Protocol-accessible<name>Protocol-Accessible Nodes</name> <t>The following tree diagram <xref target="RFC8340"/> lists all the protocol-accessible nodes defined in the "ietf-keystore"module,module without expanding the "grouping" statements:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="yangtree"><![CDATA[ module: ietf-keystore +--rw keystore {central-keystore-supported}? +---u keystore-grouping]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <t>The following tree diagram <xref target="RFC8340"/> lists all the protocol-accessible nodes defined in the "ietf-keystore" module, with all "grouping" statements expanded, enabling the keystore's full structure to beseen:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[seen.</t> <sourcecode type="yangtree"><![CDATA[ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ module: ietf-keystore +--rw keystore {central-keystore-supported}? +--rw asymmetric-keys {asymmetric-keys}? | +--rw asymmetric-key* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw public-key-format? identityref | +--rw public-key? binary | +--rw private-key-format? identityref | +--rw (private-key-type) | | +--:(cleartext-private-key) {cleartext-private-keys}? | | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary | | +--:(hidden-private-key) {hidden-private-keys}? | | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty | | +--:(encrypted-private-key) {encrypted-private-keys}? | | +--rw encrypted-private-key | | +--rw encrypted-by | | | +--rw (encrypted-by) | | | +--:(central-symmetric-key-ref) | | | | {central-keystore-supported,symme\ tric-keys}? | | | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? | | | | ks:central-symmetric-key-ref | | | +--:(central-asymmetric-key-ref) | | | {central-keystore-supported,asymm\ etric-keys}? | | | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? | | | ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref | | +--rw encrypted-value-format identityref | | +--rw encrypted-value binary | +--rw certificates | | +--rw certificate* [name] | | +--rw name string | | +--rw cert-data end-entity-cert-cms | | +---n certificate-expiration | | {certificate-expiration-notification}? | | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time | +---x generate-csr {csr-generation}? | +---w input | | +---w csr-format identityref | | +---w csr-info csr-info | +--ro output | +--ro (csr-type) | +--:(p10-csr) | +--ro p10-csr? p10-csr +--rw symmetric-keys {symmetric-keys}? +--rw symmetric-key* [name] +--rw name string +--rw key-format? identityref +--rw (key-type) +--:(cleartext-symmetric-key) | +--rw cleartext-symmetric-key? binary | {cleartext-symmetric-keys}? +--:(hidden-symmetric-key) {hidden-symmetric-keys}? | +--rw hidden-symmetric-key? empty +--:(encrypted-symmetric-key) {encrypted-symmetric-keys}? +--rw encrypted-symmetric-key +--rw encrypted-by | +--rw (encrypted-by) | +--:(central-symmetric-key-ref) | | {central-keystore-supported,symme\ tric-keys}? | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? | | ks:central-symmetric-key-ref | +--:(central-asymmetric-key-ref) | {central-keystore-supported,asymm\ etric-keys}? | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? | ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref +--rw encrypted-value-format identityref +--rw encrypted-value binary]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <t>Comments:</t> <ul> <li>Protocol-accessible nodes are those nodes that are accessible when the module is "implemented", as described in <xrefsection="5.6.5" target="RFC7950"/>.</li>target="RFC7950" sectionFormat="of" section="5.6.5"/>.</li> <li>The protocol-accessible nodes for the "ietf-keystore" module are instances of the "keystore-grouping" grouping discussed in <xref target="keystore-grouping"/>. </li> <li>The top-level node "keystore" is additionally constrained by the feature "central-keystore-supported".</li> <li>The "keystore-grouping" grouping is discussed in <xref target="keystore-grouping"/>.</li> <li>The reason for why "keystore-grouping" exists separate from the protocol-accessible nodes definition isso asto enable instances of the keystore to be instantiated in other locations, as may be needed or desired by some modules.</li> </ul> </section> </section> <section anchor="examples"> <name>Example Usage</name> <t>The examples in this section are encoded using XML, such as might be the case when using the NETCONF protocol. Other encodingsMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be used, such as JSON when using the RESTCONF protocol.</t> <section anchor="ks-inst" toc="exclude"> <name>A Keystore Instance</name> <t>The following example illustrates keys in <running>. Please see <xref target="built-ins"/> for an example illustrating built-in values in <operational>.</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="xml"><![CDATA[ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore" xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> <symmetric-keys> <symmetric-key> <name>cleartext-symmetric-key</name> <key-format>ct:octet-string-key-format</key-format> <cleartext-symmetric-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-symmetric-\ key> </symmetric-key> <symmetric-key> <name>hidden-symmetric-key</name> <hidden-symmetric-key/> </symmetric-key> <symmetric-key> <name>encrypted-symmetric-key</name> <key-format>ct:one-symmetric-key-format</key-format> <encrypted-symmetric-key> <encrypted-by> <asymmetric-key-ref>hidden-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-k\ ey-ref> </encrypted-by> <encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-enveloped-data-format</enc\ rypted-value-format> <encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value> </encrypted-symmetric-key> </symmetric-key> </symmetric-keys> <asymmetric-keys> <asymmetric-key> <name>ssh-rsa-key</name> <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-\ format> <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key> </asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key> <name>ssh-rsa-key-with-cert</name> <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-\ format> <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key> <certificates> <certificate> <name>ex-rsa-cert2</name> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </certificate> </certificates> </asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key> <name>raw-private-key</name> <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-\ format> <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key> </asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key> <name>rsa-asymmetric-key</name> <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-\ format> <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key> <certificates> <certificate> <name>ex-rsa-cert</name> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </certificate> </certificates> </asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key> <name>ec-asymmetric-key</name> <private-key-format>ct:ec-private-key-format</private-key-f\ ormat> <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key> <certificates> <certificate> <name>ex-ec-cert</name> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </certificate> </certificates> </asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key> <name>hidden-asymmetric-key</name> <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</publi\ c-key-format> <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key> <hidden-private-key/> <certificates> <certificate> <name>builtin-idevid-cert</name> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </certificate> <certificate> <name>my-ldevid-cert</name> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </certificate> </certificates> </asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key> <name>encrypted-asymmetric-key</name> <private-key-format>ct:one-asymmetric-key-format</private-k\ ey-format> <encrypted-private-key> <encrypted-by> <symmetric-key-ref>encrypted-symmetric-key</symmetric-k\ ey-ref> </encrypted-by> <encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-encrypted-data-format</enc\ rypted-value-format> <encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value> </encrypted-private-key> </asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-keys> </keystore>]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> </section> <section toc="exclude"> <name>A Certificate Expiration Notification</name> <t>The following example illustrates a "certificate-expiration" notification for a certificate associated with an asymmetric key configured in the keystore.</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="xml"><![CDATA[ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ <notification xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0"> <eventTime>2018-05-25T00:01:00Z</eventTime> <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"> <asymmetric-keys> <asymmetric-key> <name>hidden-asymmetric-key</name> <certificates> <certificate> <name>my-ldevid-cert</name> <certificate-expiration> <expiration-date>2018-08-05T14:18:53-05:00</expiration\ -date> </certificate-expiration> </certificate> </certificates> </asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-keys> </keystore> </notification>]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> </section> <section toc="exclude"> <name>The"Local"Inline or Keystore" Groupings</name> <t>This section illustrates the various "inline-or-keystore" groupings defined in the "ietf-keystore" module, specifically the "inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" (<xref target="inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping"/>), "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" (<xref target="inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping"/>), "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" (<xref target="inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping"/>), and "inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" (<xref target="inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping"/>) groupings.</t> <t>These examples assume the existence of an example module called "ex-keystore-usage"havingthat has the namespace "https://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage".</t> <t>The ex-keystore-usage module is first presented using tree diagrams <xref target="RFC8340"/>, followed by an instance example illustrating all the "inline-or-keystore" groupings in use, followed by the YANG module itself.</t> <section toc="exclude"> <name>Tree Diagrams for the "ex-keystore-usage" Module</name> <t>The following tree diagram illustrates "ex-keystore-usage" without expanding the "grouping" statements:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="yangtree"><![CDATA[ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ module: ex-keystore-usage +--rw keystore-usage +--rw symmetric-key* [name] | +--rw name string | +---u ks:inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping +--rw asymmetric-key* [name] | +--rw name string | +---u ks:inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping +--rw asymmetric-key-with-certs* [name] | +--rw name | | string | +---u ks:inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-groupi\ ng +--rw end-entity-cert-with-key* [name] +--rw name | string +---u ks:inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <t>The following tree diagram illustrates the "ex-keystore-usage"module,module with all "grouping" statements expanded, enabling the usage's full structure to be seen:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="yangtree"><![CDATA[ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ module: ex-keystore-usage +--rw keystore-usage +--rw symmetric-key* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw (inline-or-keystore) | +--:(inline) {inline-definitions-supported}? | | +--rw inline-definition | | +--rw key-format? identityref | | +--rw (key-type) | | +--:(cleartext-symmetric-key) | | | +--rw cleartext-symmetric-key? binary | | | {cleartext-symmetric-keys}? | | +--:(hidden-symmetric-key) | | | {hidden-symmetric-keys}? | | | +--rw hidden-symmetric-key? empty | | +--:(encrypted-symmetric-key) | | {encrypted-symmetric-keys}? | | +--rw encrypted-symmetric-key | | +--rw encrypted-by | | +--rw encrypted-value-format identityref | | +--rw encrypted-value binary | +--:(central-keystore) | {central-keystore-supported,symmetric-keys}? | +--rw central-keystore-reference? | ks:central-symmetric-key-ref +--rw asymmetric-key* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw (inline-or-keystore) | +--:(inline) {inline-definitions-supported}? | | +--rw inline-definition | | +--rw public-key-format? identityref | | +--rw public-key? binary | | +--rw private-key-format? identityref | | +--rw (private-key-type) | | +--:(cleartext-private-key) | | | {cleartext-private-keys}? | | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary | | +--:(hidden-private-key) {hidden-private-keys}? | | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty | | +--:(encrypted-private-key) | | {encrypted-private-keys}? | | +--rw encrypted-private-key | | +--rw encrypted-by | | +--rw encrypted-value-format identityref | | +--rw encrypted-value binary | +--:(central-keystore) | {central-keystore-supported,asymmetric-keys}? | +--rw central-keystore-reference? | ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref +--rw asymmetric-key-with-certs* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw (inline-or-keystore) | +--:(inline) {inline-definitions-supported}? | | +--rw inline-definition | | +--rw public-key-format? identityref | | +--rw public-key? binary | | +--rw private-key-format? identityref | | +--rw (private-key-type) | | | +--:(cleartext-private-key) | | | | {cleartext-private-keys}? | | | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary | | | +--:(hidden-private-key) {hidden-private-keys}? | | | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty | | | +--:(encrypted-private-key) | | | {encrypted-private-keys}? | | | +--rw encrypted-private-key | | | +--rw encrypted-by | | | +--rw encrypted-value-format identityref | | | +--rw encrypted-value binary | | +--rw certificates | | | +--rw certificate* [name] | | | +--rw name string | | | +--rw cert-data | | | | end-entity-cert-cms | | | +---n certificate-expiration | | | {certificate-expiration-notification}? | | | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time | | +---x generate-csr {csr-generation}? | | +---w input | | | +---w csr-format identityref | | | +---w csr-info csr-info | | +--ro output | | +--ro (csr-type) | | +--:(p10-csr) | | +--ro p10-csr? p10-csr | +--:(central-keystore) | {central-keystore-supported,asymmetric-keys}? | +--rw central-keystore-reference? | ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref +--rw end-entity-cert-with-key* [name] +--rw name string +--rw (inline-or-keystore) +--:(inline) {inline-definitions-supported}? | +--rw inline-definition | +--rw public-key-format? identityref | +--rw public-key? binary | +--rw private-key-format? identityref | +--rw (private-key-type) | | +--:(cleartext-private-key) | | | {cleartext-private-keys}? | | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary | | +--:(hidden-private-key) {hidden-private-keys}? | | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty | | +--:(encrypted-private-key) | | {encrypted-private-keys}? | | +--rw encrypted-private-key | | +--rw encrypted-by | | +--rw encrypted-value-format identityref | | +--rw encrypted-value binary | +--rw cert-data? | | end-entity-cert-cms | +---n certificate-expiration | | {certificate-expiration-notification}? | | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time | +---x generate-csr {csr-generation}? | +---w input | | +---w csr-format identityref | | +---w csr-info csr-info | +--ro output | +--ro (csr-type) | +--:(p10-csr) | +--ro p10-csr? p10-csr +--:(central-keystore) {central-keystore-supported,asymmetric-keys}? +--rw central-keystore-reference +--rw asymmetric-key? | ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref | {central-keystore-supported,asymmetric-keys\ }? +--rw certificate? leafref]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> </section> <section toc="exclude"> <name>Example Usage for the "ex-keystore-usage" Module</name> <t>The following example provides two equivalent instances of each grouping, the first being a reference to a keystore and the second being inlined. The instance having a reference to a keystore is consistent with the keystore defined in <xref target="ks-inst"/>. The two instances are equivalent, as the inlined instance example contains the same values defined by the keystore instance referenced by its sibling example.</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="xml"><![CDATA[ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ <keystore-usage xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage" xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> <!-- The following two equivalent examples illustrate the --> <!-- "inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" grouping: --> <symmetric-key> <name>example 1a</name> <central-keystore-reference>cleartext-symmetric-key</central-key\ store-reference> </symmetric-key> <symmetric-key> <name>example 1b</name> <inline-definition> <key-format>ct:octet-string-key-format</key-format> <cleartext-symmetric-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-symmetric-key> </inline-definition> </symmetric-key> <!-- The following two equivalent examples illustrate the --> <!-- "inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping: --> <asymmetric-key> <name>example 2a</name> <central-keystore-reference>rsa-asymmetric-key</central-keystore\ -reference> </asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key> <name>example 2b</name> <inline-definition> <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ ey-format> <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key> <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\ mat> <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key> </inline-definition> </asymmetric-key> <!--theThe following two equivalent examples illustrate the --> <!--"inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping":"inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping" --> <!-- grouping: --> <asymmetric-key-with-certs> <name>example 3a</name> <central-keystore-reference>rsa-asymmetric-key</central-keystore\ -reference> </asymmetric-key-with-certs> <asymmetric-key-with-certs> <name>example 3b</name> <inline-definition> <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ ey-format> <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key> <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\ mat> <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key> <certificates> <certificate> <name>alocally-definedlocally defined cert</name> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </certificate> </certificates> </inline-definition> </asymmetric-key-with-certs> <!-- The following two equivalent examples illustrate the --> <!-- "inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping" --> <!--"inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping":grouping: --> <end-entity-cert-with-key> <name>example 4a</name> <central-keystore-reference> <asymmetric-key>rsa-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key> <certificate>ex-rsa-cert</certificate> </central-keystore-reference> </end-entity-cert-with-key> <end-entity-cert-with-key> <name>example 4b</name> <inline-definition> <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ ey-format> <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key> <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-for\ mat> <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </inline-definition> </end-entity-cert-with-key> </keystore-usage>]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> </section> <section toc="exclude"> <name>The "ex-keystore-usage" YANG Module</name> <t>Following is the "ex-keystore-usage" module's YANG definition:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="yang"><![CDATA[ module ex-keystore-usage { yang-version 1.1; namespace "https://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage"; prefix ex-keystore-usage; import ietf-keystore { prefix ks; reference "RFCCCCC:9642: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore"; } organization "Example Corporation"; contact "Author: YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>"; description "This example module illustrates notable groupings defined in the 'ietf-keystore' module."; revision 2024-03-16 { description "Initial version"; reference "RFCCCCC:9642: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore"; } container keystore-usage { description "An illustration of the various keystore groupings."; list symmetric-key { key "name"; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for this key."; } uses ks:inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping; description "An symmetric key that may be configured locally or be a reference to a symmetric key in the keystore."; } list asymmetric-key { key "name"; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for this key."; } uses ks:inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping; description "An asymmetric key, with no certs, that may be configured locally or be a reference to an asymmetric key in the keystore. The intent is to reference just the asymmetric key, not any certificates that may also be associated with the asymmetric key."; } list asymmetric-key-with-certs { key "name"; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for this key."; } uses ks:inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping; description "An asymmetric key and its associatedcerts,certs that may be configured locally or be a reference to an asymmetric key (and its associated certs) in the keystore."; } list end-entity-cert-with-key { key "name"; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for this key."; } uses ks:inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping; description "An end-entity certificate and its associated asymmetrickey,key that may be configured locally or be a reference to another certificate (and its associated asymmetric key) in the keystore."; } } }]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> </section> </section> </section> <section anchor="keystore-yang-module"> <name>YANG Module</name> <t>This YANG module has normative references to <xref target="RFC8341"/> and <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>.</t> <t keepWithNext="true"><CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2024-03-16.yang"</t> <artwork><![CDATA[target="RFC9640"/>.</t> <sourcecode type="yang" name="ietf-keystore@2024-03-16.yang" markers="true"><![CDATA[ module ietf-keystore { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"; prefix ks; import ietf-netconf-acm { prefix nacm; reference "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model"; } import ietf-crypto-types { prefix ct; reference "RFCAAAA:9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography"; } organization "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; contact "WG Web: https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf WG List: NETCONF WG list <mailto:netconf@ietf.org> Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>"; description "This module defines a 'keystore' to centralize management of security credentials. The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). This version of this YANG module is part of RFCCCCC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcCCCC);9642 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9642); see the RFC itself for full legalnotices. The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";notices."; revision 2024-03-16 { description "Initial version"; reference "RFCCCCC:9642: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore"; } /****************/ /* Features */ /****************/ feature central-keystore-supported { description "The 'central-keystore-supported' feature indicates that the server supports the central keystore (i.e., fully implements the 'ietf-keystore' module)."; } feature inline-definitions-supported { description "The 'inline-definitions-supported' feature indicates that the server supportslocally-definedlocally defined keys."; } feature asymmetric-keys { description "The 'asymmetric-keys' feature indicates that the server implements the /keystore/asymmetric-keys subtree."; } feature symmetric-keys { description "The 'symmetric-keys' feature indicates that the server implements the /keystore/symmetric-keys subtree."; } /****************/ /* Typedefs */ /****************/ typedef central-symmetric-key-ref { type leafref { path "/ks:keystore/ks:symmetric-keys/ks:symmetric-key" + "/ks:name"; } description "This typedef enables modules to easily define a reference to a symmetric key stored in the central keystore."; } typedef central-asymmetric-key-ref { type leafref { path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key" + "/ks:name"; } description "This typedef enables modules to easily define a reference to an asymmetric key stored in the central keystore."; } /*****************/ /* Groupings */ /*****************/ grouping encrypted-by-grouping { description "A grouping that defines a 'choice' statement that can be augmented into the 'encrypted-by' node, present in the 'symmetric-key-grouping' and 'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping' groupings defined in RFCAAAA,9640, enabling references to keys in the central keystore."; choice encrypted-by { nacm:default-deny-write; mandatory true; description "A choice amongst other symmetric or asymmetric keys."; case central-symmetric-key-ref { if-feature "central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "symmetric-keys"; leaf symmetric-key-ref { type ks:central-symmetric-key-ref; description "Identifies the symmetric key used to encrypt the associated key."; } } case central-asymmetric-key-ref { if-feature "central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "asymmetric-keys"; leaf asymmetric-key-ref { type ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref; description "Identifies the asymmetric key whose public key encrypted the associated key."; } } } } // *-ref groupings grouping central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping { description"Grouping"A grouping for the reference to a certificate associated with an asymmetric key stored in the central keystore."; leaf asymmetric-key { nacm:default-deny-write; if-feature "central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "asymmetric-keys"; type ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref; must '../certificate'; description "A reference to an asymmetric key in the keystore."; } leaf certificate { nacm:default-deny-write; type leafref { path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key" + "[ks:name = current()/../asymmetric-key]/" + "ks:certificates/ks:certificate/ks:name"; } must '../asymmetric-key'; description "A reference to a specific certificate of the asymmetric key in the keystore."; } } // inline-or-keystore-* groupings grouping inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping { description "A grouping for the configuration of a symmetric key. The symmetric key may be defined inline or as a reference to a symmetric key stored in the central keystore. Servers that wish to define alternate keystore locations SHOULD augment in custom 'case' statements enabling references to those alternate keystore locations."; choice inline-or-keystore { nacm:default-deny-write; mandatory true; description "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition that exists in the keystore."; case inline { if-feature "inline-definitions-supported"; container inline-definition { description"Container"A container to hold the local key definition."; uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping; } } case central-keystore { if-feature "central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "symmetric-keys"; leaf central-keystore-reference { type ks:central-symmetric-key-ref; description "A reference toana symmetric key that exists in the central keystore."; } } } } grouping inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping { description "A grouping for the configuration of an asymmetric key. The asymmetric key may be defined inline or as a reference to an asymmetric key stored in the central keystore. Servers that wish to define alternate keystore locations SHOULD augment in custom 'case' statements enabling references to those alternate keystore locations."; choice inline-or-keystore { nacm:default-deny-write; mandatory true; description "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition that exists in the keystore."; case inline { if-feature "inline-definitions-supported"; container inline-definition { description"Container"A container to hold the local key definition."; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping; } } case central-keystore { if-feature "central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "asymmetric-keys"; leaf central-keystore-reference { type ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref; description "A reference to an asymmetric key that exists in the central keystore. The intent is to reference just the asymmetric key without any regard for any certificates that may be associated with it."; } } } } grouping inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping { description "A grouping for the configuration of an asymmetric key and its associated certificates. The asymmetric key and its associated certificates may be defined inline or as a reference to an asymmetric key (and its associated certificates) in the central keystore. Servers that wish to define alternate keystore locations SHOULD augment in custom 'case' statements enabling references to those alternate keystore locations."; choice inline-or-keystore { nacm:default-deny-write; mandatory true; description "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition that exists in the keystore."; case inline { if-feature "inline-definitions-supported"; container inline-definition { description"Container"A container to hold the local key definition."; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping; } } case central-keystore { if-feature "central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "asymmetric-keys"; leaf central-keystore-reference { type ks:central-asymmetric-key-ref; description "A reference to anasymmetric-keyasymmetric key (and all of its associated certificates) in the keystore, when this module is implemented."; } } } } grouping inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping { description "A grouping for the configuration of an asymmetric key and its associated end-entity certificate. The asymmetric key and its associated end-entity certificate may be defined inline or as a reference to an asymmetric key (and its associated end-entity certificate) in the central keystore. Servers that wish to define alternate keystore locations SHOULD augment in custom 'case' statements enabling references to those alternate keystore locations."; choice inline-or-keystore { nacm:default-deny-write; mandatory true; description "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition that exists in the keystore."; case inline { if-feature "inline-definitions-supported"; container inline-definition { description"Container"A container to hold the local key definition."; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping; } } case central-keystore { if-feature "central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "asymmetric-keys"; container central-keystore-reference { uses central-asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping; description "A reference to a specific certificate associated with an asymmetric key stored in the central keystore."; } } } } // the keystore grouping grouping keystore-grouping { description"Grouping"A grouping definition enables use in other contexts. If ever done, implementations MUST augment new 'case' statements into the various inline-or-keystore 'choice' statements to supply leafrefs to the model-specific location(s)."; container asymmetric-keys { nacm:default-deny-write; if-feature "asymmetric-keys"; description "A list of asymmetric keys."; list asymmetric-key { key "name"; description "An asymmetric key."; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for the asymmetric key."; } uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping; } } container symmetric-keys { nacm:default-deny-write; if-feature "symmetric-keys"; description "A list of symmetric keys."; list symmetric-key { key "name"; description "A symmetric key."; leaf name { type string; description "An arbitrary name for the symmetric key."; } uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping; } } } /*********************************/ /* Protocol accessible nodes */ /*********************************/ container keystore { if-featurecentral-keystore-supported;"central-keystore-supported"; description "A central keystore containing a list of symmetric keys and a list of asymmetric keys."; nacm:default-deny-write; uses keystore-grouping { augment "symmetric-keys/symmetric-key/key-type/encrypted-" + "symmetric-key/encrypted-symmetric-key/encrypted-by" { description "Augments in a choice statement enabling the encrypting key to be any other symmetric or asymmetric key in the central keystore."; uses encrypted-by-grouping; } augment "asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key-type/" + "encrypted-private-key/encrypted-private-key/" + "encrypted-by" { description "Augments in a choice statement enabling the encrypting key to be any other symmetric or asymmetric key in the central keystore."; uses encrypted-by-grouping; } } } }]]></artwork> <t keepWithPrevious="true"><CODE ENDS></t>]]></sourcecode> </section> </section> <section anchor="built-ins"> <name>Support forBuilt-inBuilt-In Keys</name> <t>In some implementations, a server may support keys built into the server. Built-in keysMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be set during the manufacturing process or be dynamically generated the first time the server is booted or a particular service (e.g.,SSH)Secure Shell (SSH)) is enabled.</t> <t>Built-in keys are "hidden" keys expected to be set by a vendor-specific process. Any ability for operators to set and/or modify built-in keys is outside the scope of this document.</t> <t>The primary characteristic of the built-in keys is that they are provided by the server, as opposed toconfiguration.being configured. As such, they are present in <operational> (<xrefsection="5.3" target="RFC8342"/>),target="RFC8342" sectionFormat="of" section="5.3"/>) and <system> <xref target="I-D.ietf-netmod-system-config"/>, if implemented.</t> <t>The example below illustrates what the keystore in <operational> might look like for a server in its factory default state. Note that the built-in keys have the "or:origin" annotation value "or:system".</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="xml"><![CDATA[ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore" xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types" xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin" or:origin="or:intended"> <asymmetric-keys> <asymmetric-key or:origin="or:system"> <name>Manufacturer-Generated Hidden Key</name> <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ ey-format> <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key> <hidden-private-key/> <certificates> <certificate> <name>Manufacturer-Generated IDevID Cert</name> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </certificate> </certificates> </asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-keys> </keystore>]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <t>The following example illustrates how a single built-in key definition from the previous example has been propagated to <running>:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="xml"><![CDATA[ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore" xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> <asymmetric-keys> <asymmetric-key> <name>Manufacturer-Generated Hidden Key</name> <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ ey-format> <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key> <hidden-private-key/> <certificates> <certificate> <name>Manufacturer-Generated IDevID Cert</name> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </certificate> <certificate> <name>Deployment-Specific LDevID Cert</name> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </certificate> </certificates> </asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-keys> </keystore>]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> <t>After the above configuration is applied, <operational> should appear as follows:</t><artwork><![CDATA[<sourcecode type="xml"><![CDATA[ =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================ <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore" xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types" xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin" or:origin="or:intended"> <asymmetric-keys> <asymmetric-key or:origin="or:system"> <name>Manufacturer-Generated Hidden Key</name> <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-k\ ey-format> <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key> <hidden-private-key/> <certificates> <certificate> <name>Manufacturer-Generated IDevID Cert</name> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </certificate> <certificate or:origin="or:intended"> <name>Deployment-Specific LDevID Cert</name> <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data> </certificate> </certificates> </asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-keys> </keystore>]]></artwork>]]></sourcecode> </section> <section> <name>Encrypting Keys in Configuration</name> <t>This section describes an approach that enables both the symmetric and asymmetric keys on a server to be encrypted, such thattraditionalbackup/restore procedures can be used without concern for raw key data being compromised when in transit.</t> <t>The approach presented in this section is not normative. This section answers how a configuration containing secrets that are encrypted by a built-in key (<xref target="built-ins"/>) can bebackup'edbacked up from one server and restored on a differentserver,server when each server has uniquemasterprimary keys. The API defined by the "ietf-keystore" YANG module presented in this document is sufficient to support the workflow described in this section.</t> <section toc="exclude"> <name>Key Encryption Key</name> <t>The ability to encrypt configured keys is predicated on the existence of a"keykey encryptionkey"key (KEK). There may be any number of KEKs in a server. A KEK, by its namesake, is a key that is used to encrypt other keys. A KEKMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be either a symmetric key or an asymmetric key.</t> <t>If a KEK is a symmetric key, then the serverMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide an API for administrators to encrypt other keys without needing to know the symmetric key's value. If the KEK is an asymmetric key, then the serverSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> provide an API enabling the encryption of other keys or, alternatively, assume the administrators can do so themselves using the asymmetric key's public half.</t> <t>A serverMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> possess access to the KEK, or an API using the KEK, so that it can decrypt the other keys in the configuration at runtime.</t> </section> <section toc="exclude"> <name>Configuring Encrypted Keys</name> <t>Each time a new key is configured, itSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be encrypted by a KEK.</t> <t>In the "ietf-crypto-types" module <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>,target="RFC9640"/>, the format for encrypted values is described by identity statements derived from the "symmetrically-encrypted-value-format" and "asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format" identity statements.</t> <t>Implementations of servers implementing the "ietf-keystore" moduleSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> provide an API that simultaneously generates a key and encrypts the generated key using a KEK.ThusThus, the cleartext value of the newly generated key may never be known to the administrators generating the keys. Such an API is defined in the "ietf-ssh-common" andthe"ietf-tls-common" YANG modules defined in <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server"/>,target="RFC9644"/> and <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server"/>,target="RFC9645"/>, respectively.</t> <t>In case the server implementation does not provide such an API, then the generating and encrypting stepsMAY<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be performed outside the server, e.g., by an administrator with special access control rights(e.g.,(such as an organization's crypto officer).</t> <t>In either case, the encrypted key can be configured into the keystore using either the "encrypted-symmetric-key" (for symmetric keys) or the "encrypted-private-key" (for asymmetric keys) nodes. These two nodes contain both the encrypted raw key value as well as a reference to the KEK that encrypted the key.</t> </section> <section toc="exclude"> <name>Migrating Configuration to Another Server</name> <t>When a KEK is used to encrypt other keys, migrating the configuration to another server is only possible if the second server has the same KEK. How the second server comes to have the same KEK is discussed in this section.</t> <t>In some deployments, mechanisms outside the scope of this document may be used to migrate a KEK from one server to another. That said, beware that the ability to do so typically entails having access to the firstserver but,server; however, in some scenarios, the first server may no longer be operational.</t> <t>In other deployments, an organization's crypto officer, possessing a KEK's cleartext value, configures the same KEK on the second server, presumably as a hidden key or a key protected byaccess-control,access control, so that the cleartext value is not disclosed to regular administrators. However, this approach createshigh-couplinghigh coupling to and dependency on the crypto officers that does not scale in production environments.</t> <t>In order to decouple the crypto officers from the regular administrators, a special KEK, called the"master"primary key"(MK),(PK), may be used.</t> <t>AMKPK is commonly aglobally-uniqueglobally unique built-in (see <xref target="built-ins"/>) asymmetric key. The private raw key value, due to its long lifetime, is hidden (i.e.,"hidden-private-key" in"hidden-private-key"; see <xrefsection="2.1.4.5." target="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>).target="RFC9640" sectionFormat="of" section="2.1.4.5."/>). The raw public key value is often contained in an identity certificate (e.g., IDevID). How to configurea MKan PK during the manufacturing process is outside the scope of this document.</t> <t>Assuming the server has aMK,PK, theMKPK can be used to encrypt a "shared KEK", which is then used to encrypt the keys configured by regular administrators.</t> <t>With this extra level of indirection, it is possible for a crypto officer to encrypt the same KEK for a multiplicity of servers offline using the public key contained in their identity certificates. The crypto officer can then safelyhandoffhand off the encrypted KEKs to regular administrators responsible for server installations, including migrations.</t> <t>In order to migrate the configuration from a first server, an administrator would need to make just a single modification to the configuration before loading it onto a second server, which is to replace the encrypted KEK keystore entry from the first server with the encrypted KEK for the second server. Upon doing this, the configuration (containing many encrypted keys) can be loaded into the second server while enabling the second server to decrypt all the encrypted keys in the configuration.</t> <t>The following diagram illustrates this idea:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ +-------------+ +-------------+ | shared KEK | | shared KEK | |(unencrypted)|-------------------------------> | (encrypted) | +-------------+ encrypts offline using +-------------+ ^ each server'sMKPK | | | | | | possesses \o | +-------------- |\ | / \ shares with | crypto +--------------------+ officer | | | +----------------------+ | +----------------------+ | server-1 | | | server-2 | | configuration | | | configuration | | | | | | | | | | | | +----------------+ | | | +----------------+ | | |MK-1PK-1 | | | | |MK-2PK-2 | | | | (hidden) | | | | | (hidden) | | | +----------------+ | | | +----------------+ | | ^ | | | ^ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | encrypted | | | | encrypted | | | by | | | | by | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +----------------+ | | | +----------------+ | | | shared KEK | | | | | shared KEK | | | | (encrypted) | | v | | (encrypted) | | | +----------------+ | | +----------------+ | | ^ | regular | ^ | | | | admin | | | | | | | | | | | encrypted | \o | | encrypted | | | by | |\ | | by | | | | / \ | | | | | | | | | | +----------------+ |----------------->| +----------------+ | | | all other keys | | migrate | | all other keys | | | | (encrypted) | | configuration | | (encrypted) | | | +----------------+ | | +----------------+ | | | | | +----------------------+ +----------------------+ ]]></artwork> </section> </section> <section> <name>Security Considerations</name> <section> <name>Security of Data at Rest and in Motion</name> <t>The YANG module defined in this document defines a mechanism called a "keystore" that intends to protect its contents from unauthorized disclosure and modification.</t> <t>In order to satisfy the expectations of a"keystore",keystore, it isRECOMMENDED<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that server implementations ensure that the keystore contents are encrypted when persisted to non-volatilememory,memory andensurethat the keystore contents that have been decrypted in volatile memory are zeroized when not in use.</t> <t>The keystore contents may be encryptedeitherby either encrypting the contents individually (e.g., using the "encrypted" value formats)or, in caseor using persistence-layer-level encryption. If storing cleartext valuesare used(which isNOT RECOMMENDED<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14> per <xrefsection="3.5" target="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>), then, e.g., disk-leveltarget="RFC9640" sectionFormat="of" section="3.5"/>), then persistence-layer-level encryptionmay<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> beused.</t>used to protect the data at rest.</t> <t>If the keystore contents are not encrypted when persisted, then server implementationsMUST<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ensure the persisted storage is inaccessible.</t> </section> <section> <name>Unconstrained Private Key Usage</name> <t>This module enables the configuration of private keys without constraints on their usage, e.g., what operations the key is allowed to be used for(e.g.,(such as signature, decryption, or both).</t> <t>This module also does not constrain the usage of the associated publickeys,keys other than in the context of a configured certificate (e.g., an identity certificate), in which case the key usage is constrained by the certificate.</t> </section> <section anchor="sec-mod"><name>Considerations<!--[rfced] *AD - We note that the text in Section 3.8 does not exactly match the YANG security considerations boilerplate text listed at <https://wiki.ietf.org/group/ops/yang-security-guidelines>, including missing references to RFC 6242 and 8446. Please review and let us know if the text should be updated to match. --> <name>Security Considerations for the "ietf-keystore" YANG Module</name> <t>This sectionfollowsis modeled after the template defined in <xrefsection="3.7.1" target="RFC8407"/>.</t>target="RFC8407" sectionFormat="of" section="3.7.1"/>.</t> <!-- DNE: YANG Security Boilerplate: Begin paragraph 1 SG reveted - AQed bc does not match the template --> <t>The ietf-keystore YANG moduledefined in this documentdefines a data model that is designed to be accessed viaYANG basedYANG-based management protocols, such as NETCONF <xref target="RFC6241"/> and RESTCONF <xref target="RFC8040"/>.Both of theseThese protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g.,SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.</t>SSH <xref target="RFC4252"/>, TLS <xref target="RFC8446"/>, and QUIC <xref target="RFC9000"/>) and mandatory-to-implement mutal authentication. </t> <!-- End paragraph 1--> <!-- Begin paragraph 2 --> <t>The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) <xref target="RFC8341"/> provides the means to restrict access for particular users to apre-configuredpreconfigured subset of all available protocol operations and content.</t> <!--End paragraph 2--> <!-- Paragraph 3 is missing (or it's the paragraph below, which does not match the template --> <t>Please be aware that this YANG module uses groupings from other YANG modules that define nodes that may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. Please review the Security Considerations for dependent YANG modules for information as to which nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments.</t> <!-- Begin Paragraph 4 --> <t>Some of the readable data nodesdefinedin this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes.The followingThese are the subtrees and data nodeshave particularand their sensitivity/vulnerability: <!-- End paragraph 4--> <!--End DNE--> </t><ul spacing="normal"> <li> <t>The "cleartext-symmetric-key" node: </t> <ul empty="true"> <li>The<dl spacing="normal" newline="true"> <dt>The "cleartext-symmetric-key" node:</dt> <dd>This node, imported from the "symmetric-key-grouping" grouping defined in <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>target="RFC9640"/>, is additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never be returned to a client. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all" was applied to it in <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>.</li> </ul> </li> <li> <t>The "cleartext-private-key" node: </t> <ul empty="true"> <li>Thetarget="RFC9640"/>.</dd> <dt>The "cleartext-private-key"nodenode:</dt> <dd>This node, defined in the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" groupingdefinedin <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>target="RFC9640"/>, is additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never be returned to a client. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all" is applied to it in <xreftarget="I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types"/>.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>target="RFC9640"/>.</dd> </dl> <t>All the writable data nodes defined by this YANG module, both in the "grouping" statements as well as the protocol-accessible "keystore" instance, may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. For instance, any modification to a key or reference to a key may dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for all data nodes defined in this module.</t> <t>This YANG module does not define any "rpc" or "action" statements, and thus the security considerations for such is not provided here.</t> <t>Built-in key typesSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> beeitherhidden and/or encrypted (not cleartext). If this is not possible, access control mechanisms like NACMSHOULD<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used to limit access to the key's secret data to only the most trusted authorized clients (e.g., belonging to anorganization’sorganization's crypto officer).</t> </section> </section> <section> <name>IANA Considerations</name> <section> <name>The"IETF XML"IETF XML Registry</name><t>This document registers one<t>IANA has registered the following URI in the "ns"subregistryregistry of theIETF"IETF XMLRegistry <xref target="RFC3688"/>. Following the format inRegistry" <xreftarget="RFC3688"/>, the following registration is requested:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore Registrant Contact:target="RFC3688"/>.</t> <dl spacing="compact"> <dt>URI:</dt><dd> urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore</dd> <dt>Registrant Contact:</dt><dd> TheIESG XML: N/A,IESG</dd> <dt>XML:</dt><dd>N/A; the requested URI is an XMLnamespace. ]]></artwork>namespace.</dd> </dl> </section> <section> <name>The"YANGYANG ModuleNames"Names Registry</name><t>This document registers one<t>IANA has registered the following YANG module in theYANG"YANG ModuleNamesNames" registry<xref target="RFC6020"/>. Following the formatdefined in <xreftarget="RFC6020"/>, the following registration is requested:</t> <artwork><![CDATA[ name: ietf-keystore namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore prefix: ks reference: RFC CCCC ]]></artwork>target="RFC6020"/>. </t> <dl spacing="compact"> <dt>Name:</dt><dd>ietf-keystore</dd> <dt>Maintained by IANA:</dt><dd>N</dd> <dt>Namespace:</dt><dd>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore</dd> <dt>Prefix:</dt><dd>ks</dd> <dt>Reference:</dt><dd>RFC 9642</dd> </dl> </section> </section> </middle> <back> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-netmod-system-config" to="NETMOD-SYSTEM-CONFIG"/> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server" to="HTTP-CLIENT-SERVER"/> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server" to="NETCONF-CLIENT-SERVER"/> <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server" to="RESTCONF-CLIENT-SERVER"/> <references> <name>References</name> <references> <name>Normative References</name><reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"> <front> <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title> <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/> <date month="March" year="1997"/> <abstract> <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4252.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6020.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6241.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7950.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8040.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8341.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8446.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9000.xml"/> <!-- [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] companion documentspecifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/> </reference>RFC 9640 --> <referenceanchor="RFC6020" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6020.xml">anchor="RFC9640" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9640"> <front> <title>YANG- ADataModeling LanguageTypes and Groupings forthe Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)</title>Cryptography</title> <authorfullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Bjorklund"/>initials="K." surname="Watsen" fullname="Kent Watsen"> <organization>Watsen Networks</organization> </author> <datemonth="October" year="2010"/> <abstract> <t>YANG is a data modeling language used to model configuration and state data manipulated by the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF), NETCONF remote procedure calls, and NETCONF notifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract>month="August" year="2024"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC"value="6020"/>value="9640"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI"value="10.17487/RFC6020"/>value="10.17487/RFC9640"/> </reference> </references> <references> <name>Informative References</name> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3688.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8259.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8340.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8342.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8407.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8792.xml"/> <!-- [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] companion document RFC 9641--> <referenceanchor="RFC7950" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7950.xml">anchor="RFC9641" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9641"> <front><title>The<title>A YANG1.1DataModeling Language</title>Model for a Truststore</title> <authorfullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Bjorklund"/>initials="K." surname="Watsen" fullname="Kent Watsen"> <organization>Watsen Networks</organization> </author> <date month="August"year="2016"/> <abstract> <t>YANG is a data modeling language used to model configuration data, state data, Remote Procedure Calls, and notifications for network management protocols. This document describes the syntax and semantics of version 1.1 of the YANG language. YANG version 1.1 is a maintenance release of the YANG language, addressing ambiguities and defects in the original specification. There are a small number of backward incompatibilities from YANG version 1. This document also specifies the YANG mappings to the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF).</t> </abstract>year="2024"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC"value="7950"/>value="9641"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI"value="10.17487/RFC7950"/>value="10.17487/RFC9641"/> </reference> <!-- [I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server] companion document RFC 9643 --> <referenceanchor="RFC8341" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8341.xml">anchor="RFC9643" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9643"> <front><title>Network Configuration Access Control Model</title><title>YANG Groupings for TCP Clients and TCP Servers</title> <authorfullname="A. Bierman" initials="A." surname="Bierman"/>initials="K." surname="Watsen" fullname="Kent Watsen"> <organization>Watsen Networks</organization> </author> <authorfullname="M. Bjorklund"initials="M."surname="Bjorklund"/> <date month="March" year="2018"/> <abstract> <t>The standardization of network configuration interfaces for use with the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) or the RESTCONF protocol requires a structured and secure operating environment that promotes human usability and multi-vendor interoperability. There is a need for standard mechanisms to restrict NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol access for particular users to a preconfigured subsetsurname="Scharf" fullname="Michael Scharf"> <organization>Hochschule Esslingen - University ofall available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content. This document defines such an access control model.</t> <t>This document obsoletes RFC 6536.</t> </abstract>Applied Sciences</organization> </author> <date month="August" year="2024"/> </front> <seriesInfoname="STD" value="91"/> <seriesInfoname="RFC"value="8341"/>value="9643"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI"value="10.17487/RFC8341"/>value="10.17487/RFC9643"/> </reference><xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types.xml"/> </references> <references> <name>Informative References</name><!-- [I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server] companion document RFC 9644--> <referenceanchor="RFC3688" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3688.xml">anchor="RFC9644" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9644"> <front><title>The IETF XML Registry</title><title>YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers</title> <authorfullname="M. Mealling" initials="M." surname="Mealling"/>initials="K." surname="Watsen" fullname="Kent Watsen"> <organization>Watsen Networks</organization> </author> <datemonth="January" year="2004"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes an IANA maintained registry for IETF standards which use Extensible Markup Language (XML) related items such as Namespaces, Document Type Declarations (DTDs), Schemas, and Resource Description Framework (RDF) Schemas.</t> </abstract>month="August" year="2024"/> </front> <seriesInfoname="BCP" value="81"/> <seriesInfoname="RFC"value="3688"/>value="9644"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI"value="10.17487/RFC3688"/>value="10.17487/RFC9644"/> </reference><reference anchor="RFC6241" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6241.xml"> <front> <title>Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)</title> <author fullname="R. Enns" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Enns"/> <author fullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Bjorklund"/> <author fullname="J. Schoenwaelder" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Schoenwaelder"/> <author fullname="A. Bierman" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Bierman"/> <date month="June" year="2011"/> <abstract> <t>The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) defined in this document provides mechanisms to install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices. It uses an Extensible Markup Language (XML)-based data encoding for the configuration data as well as the protocol messages. The NETCONF protocol operations are realized<!-- [I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server] IESG state: RFC Ed Queue asremote procedure calls (RPCs). Thisof 04/01/24; companion documentobsoletesRFC4741. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6241"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6241"/> </reference>9645 --> <referenceanchor="RFC8040" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8040.xml">anchor="RFC9645" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9645"> <front><title>RESTCONF Protocol</title> <author fullname="A. Bierman" initials="A." surname="Bierman"/> <author fullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." surname="Bjorklund"/><title>YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers</title> <authorfullname="K. Watsen"initials="K."surname="Watsen"/>surname="Watsen" fullname="Kent Watsen"> <organization>Watsen Networks</organization> </author> <datemonth="January" year="2017"/> <abstract> <t>This document describes an HTTP-based protocol that provides a programmatic interface for accessing data defined in YANG, using the datastore concepts defined in the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF).</t> </abstract>month="August" year="2024"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC"value="8040"/>value="9645"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI"value="10.17487/RFC8040"/>value="10.17487/RFC9645"/> </reference><reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"> <front> <title>Ambiguity<!-- [I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server] IESG state: IESG Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed (8/23/2024)--> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server"/> <!-- [I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server] IESG state: AD Evaluation as ofUppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title> <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/> <date month="May" year="2017"/> <abstract> <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage08/23/24 --> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server"/> <!-- [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server] IESG state: AD Evaluation as ofthe key words have the defined special meanings.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8340" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8340.xml"> <front> <title>YANG Tree Diagrams</title> <author fullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." surname="Bjorklund"/> <author fullname="L. Berger" initials="L." role="editor" surname="Berger"/> <date month="March" year="2018"/> <abstract> <t>This document captures the current syntax used in YANG module tree diagrams. The purpose8/23/2024 --> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server"/> <!-- [I-D.ietf-netmod-system-config] IESG state: I-D Exists as ofthis document is to provide a single location for this definition. This syntax may be updated from time to time based on8/23/24. Entered theevolution oflong way to display theYANG language.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="215"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8340"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8340"/> </reference>Ed role --> <referenceanchor="RFC8342" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8342.xml">anchor="I-D.ietf-netmod-system-config" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netmod-system-config-08"> <front><title>Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)</title><title>System-defined Configuration</title> <authorfullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." surname="Bjorklund"/> <author fullname="J. Schoenwaelder" initials="J." surname="Schoenwaelder"/> <author fullname="P. Shafer" initials="P." surname="Shafer"/> <author fullname="K. Watsen" initials="K." surname="Watsen"/>fullname="Qiufang Ma" initials="Q." surname="Ma" role="editor"> <organization>Huawei</organization> </author> <authorfullname="R. Wilton" initials="R." surname="Wilton"/> <date month="March" year="2018"/> <abstract> <t>Datastores are a fundamental concept binding the data models written in the YANG data modeling language to network management protocols such as the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) and RESTCONF. This document defines an architectural framework for datastores based on the experience gained with the initial simpler model, addressing requirements that were not well supported in the initial model. This document updates RFC 7950.</t> </abstract> </front> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8342"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8342"/> </reference> <reference anchor="RFC8407" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8407.xml"> <front> <title>Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG Data Models</title>fullname="Qin Wu" initials="Q." surname="Wu"> <organization>Huawei</organization> </author> <authorfullname="A. Bierman" initials="A." surname="Bierman"/>fullname="Chong Feng" initials="C." surname="Feng"/> <datemonth="October" year="2018"/> <abstract> <t>This memo provides guidelines for authors and reviewers of specifications containing YANG modules. Recommendations and procedures are defined, which are intended to increase interoperability and usability of Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) and RESTCONF protocol implementations that utilize YANG modules. This document obsoletes RFC 6087.</t> </abstract>day="18" month="June" year="2024"/> </front> <seriesInfoname="BCP" value="216"/> <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8407"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8407"/>name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-netmod-system-config-08"/> </reference><xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server.xml"/> <xi:include href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-netmod-system-config.xml"/><reference anchor="Std-802.1AR-2018" target="https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802_1AR-2018.html"> <front> <title>IEEE Standard for Local andmetropolitan area networksMetropolitan Area Networks - Secure Device Identity</title> <author><organization>IEEE SA-Standards Board</organization><organization>IEEE</organization> </author> <date month="August" year="2018"/> </front> <seriesInfo name="IEEE Std" value="802.1AR-2018"/> <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794"/> </reference> <reference anchor="W3C.REC-xml-20081126" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="W3C.REC-xml-20081126"> <front> <title>Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fifth Edition)</title> <author initials="T." surname="Bray"/> <author initials="J." surname="Paoli"/> <author initials="C. M." surname="Sperberg-McQueen"/> <author initials="E." surname="Maler"/> <author initials="F." surname="Yergeau"/> <date month="November" year="2008"/> </front> <refcontent>W3C Recommendation REC-xml-20081126</refcontent> </reference> </references> </references> <sectionanchor="change-log"> <name>Change Log</name> <section> <name>00 to 01</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Replaced the 'certificate-chain' structures with PKCS#7 structures. (Issue #1)</li> <li>Added 'private-key' as a configurable data node, and removed the 'generate-private-key' and 'load-private-key' actions. (Issue #2)</li> <li>Moved 'user-auth-credentials' to the ietf-ssh-client module. (Issues #4 and #5)</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>01 to 02</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Added back 'generate-private-key' action.</li> <li>Removed 'RESTRICTED' enum from the 'private-key' leaf type.</li> <li>Fixed up a few description statements.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>02 to 03</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Changed draft's title.</li> <li>Added missing references.</li> <li>Collapsed sections and levels.</li> <li>Added RFC 8174 to Requirements Language Section.</li> <li>Renamed 'trusted-certificates' to 'pinned-certificates'.</li> <li>Changed 'public-key' from config false to config true.</li> <li>Switched 'host-key' from OneAsymmetricKey to definition from RFC 4253.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>03 to 04</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Added typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore paths</li> <li>Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams</li> <li>Removed Design Considerations section</li> <li>Moved key and certificate definitions from data tree to groupings</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>04 to 05</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Removed trust anchors (now in their own draft)</li> <li>Added back global keystore structure</li> <li>Added groupings enabling keys to either be locally defined or a reference to the keystore.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>05 to 06</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Added feature "local-keys-supported"</li> <li>Added nacm:default-deny-all and nacm:default-deny-write</li> <li>Renamed generate-asymmetric-key to generate-hidden-key</li> <li>Added an install-hidden-key action</li> <li>Moved actions inside fo the "asymmetric-key" container</li> <li>Moved some groupings to draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>06 to 07</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Removed a "require-instance false"</li> <li>Clarified some description statements</li> <li>Improved the keystore-usage examples</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>07 to 08</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Added "inline-definition" containers to avoid posibility of the action/notification statements being under a "case" statement.</li> <li>Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, folding algorithm, and reformatted the YANG module.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>08 to 09</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Added a 'description' statement to the 'must' in the /keystore/asymmetric-key node explaining that the descendant values may exist in <operational> only, and that implementation MUST assert that the values are either configured or that they exist in <operational>.</li> <li>Copied above 'must' statement (and description) into the inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping, inline-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping, and inline-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping statements.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>09 to 10</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Updated draft title to match new truststore draft title</li> <li>Moved everything under a top-level 'grouping' to enable use in other contexts.</li> <li>Renamed feature from 'local-keys-supported' to 'inline-definitions-supported' (same name used in truststore)</li> <li>Removed the either-all-or-none 'must' expressions for the key's 3-tuple values (since the values are now 'mandatory true' in crypto-types)</li> <li>Example updated to reflect 'mandatory true' change in crypto-types draft</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>10 to 11</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Replaced typedef asymmetric-key-certificate-ref with grouping asymmetric-key-certificate-ref-grouping.</li> <li>Added feature feature 'key-generation'.</li> <li>Cloned groupings symmetric-key-grouping, asymmetric-key-pair-grouping, asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping, and asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping from crypto-keys, augmenting into each new case statements for values that have been encrypted by other keys in the keystore. Refactored keystore model to use these groupings.</li> <li>Added new 'symmetric-keys' lists, as a sibling to the existing 'asymmetric-keys' list.</li> <li>Added RPCs (not actions) 'generate-symmetric-key' and 'generate-asymmetric-key' to *return* a (potentially encrypted) key.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>11 to 12</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Updated to reflect crypto-type's draft using enumerations over identities.</li> <li>Added examples for the 'generate-symmetric-key' and 'generate-asymmetric-key' RPCs.</li> <li>Updated the Introduction section.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>12 to 13</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Updated examples to incorporate new "key-format" identities.</li> <li>Made the two "generate-*-key" RPCs be "action" statements instead.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>13 to 14</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Updated YANG module and examples to incorporate the new iana-*-algorithm modules in the crypto-types draft.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>14 to 15</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Added new "Support for Built-in Keys" section.</li> <li>Added 'must' expressions asserting that the 'key-format' leaf whenever an encrypted key is specified.</li> <li>Added inline-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping for PSK support.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>15 to 16</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Moved the generate key actions to ietf-crypt-types as RPCs, which are augmented by ietf-keystore to support encrypted keys. Examples updated accordingly.</li> <li>Added a SSH certificate-based key (RFC 6187) and a raw private key to the example instance document (partly so they could be referenced by examples in the SSH and TLS client/server drafts.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>16 to 17</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Removed augments to the "generate-symmetric-key" and "generate-asymmetric-key" groupings.</li> <li>Removed "generate-symmetric-key" and "generate-asymmetric-key" examples.</li> <li>Removed the "algorithm" nodes from remaining examples.</li> <li>Updated the "Support for Built-in Keys" section.</li> <li>Added new section "Encrypting Keys in Configuration".</li> <li>Added a "Note to Reviewers" note to first page.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>17 to 18</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Removed dangling/unnecessary ref to RFC 8342.</li> <li>r/MUST/SHOULD/ wrt strength of keys being configured over transports.</li> <li>Added an example for the "certificate-expiration" notification.</li> <li>Clarified that OS MAY have a multiplicity of underlying keystores and/or TPMs.</li> <li>Clarified expected behavior for "built-in" keys in <operational></li> <li>Clarified the "Migrating Configuration to Another Server" section.</li> <li>Expanded "Data Model Overview section(s) [remove "wall" of tree diagrams].</li> <li>Updated the Security Considerations section.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>18 to 19</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Updated examples to reflect new "cleartext-" prefix in the crypto-types draft.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>19 to 20</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Addressed SecDir comments from Magnus Nystroem and Sandra Murphy.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>20 to 21</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Added a "Unconstrained Private Key Usage" Security Consideration to address concern raised by SecDir.</li> <li>(Editorial) Removed the output of "grouping" statements in the tree diagrams for the "ietf-keystore" and "ex-keystore-usage" modules.</li> <li>Addressed comments raised by YANG Doctor.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>21 to 22</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Added prefixes to 'path' statements per trust-anchors/issues/1</li> <li>Renamed feature "keystore-supported" to "central-keystore-supported".</li> <li>Associated with above, generally moved text to refer to a "central" keystore.</li> <li>Aligned modules with `pyang -f` formatting.</li> <li>Fixed nits found by YANG Doctor reviews.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>22 to 23</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Updated 802.1AR ref to latest version</li> <li>Replaced "base64encodedvalue==" with "BASE64VALUE=" in examples.</li> <li>Minor editorial nits</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>23 to 24</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Added features "asymmetric-keys" and "symmetric-keys"</li> <li>fixup the 'WG Web' and 'WG List' lines in YANG module(s)</li> <li>fixup copyright (i.e., s/Simplified/Revised/) in YANG module(s)</li> <li>Added Informative reference to ma-netmod-with-system</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>24 to 25</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Added a "term" for "key" (IEEE liaison).</li> <li>Clarified draft text to ensure proper use of the "key" term. (IEEE liaison)</li> <li>Added statement that built-in keys SHOULD NOT be cleartext. (IEEE liaison)</li> <li>Added "if-feature central-keystore-supported" to top-level "keystore" container.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>25 to 26</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Updated per Shepherd reviews impacting the suite of drafts.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>26 to 27</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Updated per Shepherd reviews impacting the suite of drafts.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>27 to 28</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Updated per Tom Petch review.</li> <li>s/local/inline/ in feature names, grouping names, and node names.</li> <li>Removed special handling text for built-in keys</li> <li>Updated section on built-in keys to read almost the same as the section in the trust-anchors draft.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>28 to 29</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Addresses AD review comments.</li> <li>Added note to Editor to fix line foldings.</li> <li>Renamed "keystore" to "central keystore" throughout.</li> <li>Renamed "encrypted-by-choice-grouping" to "encrypted-by-grouping".</li> <li>Removed "public-key-format" and "public-key" nodes from examples.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>29 to 30</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Addresses Gen-ART review by Reese Enghardt.</li> <li>Addresses review by Tom Petch.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>30 to 31</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Addresses 1st-round of IESG reviews.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>31 to 33</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Addresses issues found in OpsDir review of the ssh-client-server draft.</li> <li>Renamed Security Considerations section s/Template for/Considerations for/</li> <li>s/defines/presents/ in a few places.</li> <li>Add refs to where the 'operational' and 'system' datastores are defined.</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>33 to 34</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Nothing changed. Only bumped for automation...</li> </ul> </section> <section> <name>34 to 35</name> <ul spacing="normal"> <li>Address Roman Danyliw's comments.</li> </ul> </section> </section> <sectionnumbered="false"> <name>Acknowledgements</name> <t>The authors would like to thank the following for lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered by first name):Alan Luchuk, Andy Bierman, Benoit Claise, Bert Wijnen, Balázs Kovács, David Lamparter, Eric Voit, Éric Vyncke, Francesca Palombini, Ladislav Lhotka, Liang Xia, Jürgen Schönwälder, Mahesh Jethanandani, Magnus Nyström, Martin Björklund, Mehmet Ersue, Murray Kucherawy, Paul Wouters, Phil Shafer, Qin Wu,<contact fullname="Alan Luchuk"/>, <contact fullname="Andy Bierman"/>, <contact fullname="Balázs Kovács"/>, <contact fullname="Benoit Claise"/>, <contact fullname="Bert Wijnen"/>, <contact fullname="David Lamparter"/>, <contact fullname="Eric Voit"/>, <contact fullname="Éric Vyncke"/>, <contact fullname="Francesca Palombini"/>, <contact fullname="Jürgen Schönwälder"/>, <contact fullname="Ladislav Lhotka"/>, <contact fullname="Liang Xia"/>, <contact fullname="Magnus Nyström"/>, <contact fullname="Mahesh Jethanandani"/>, <contact fullname="Martin Björklund"/>, <contact fullname="Mehmet Ersue"/>, <contact fullname="Murray Kucherawy"/>, <contact fullname="Paul Wouters"/>, <contact fullname="Phil Shafer"/>, <contact fullname="Qin Wu"/>, <contact fullname=" RadekKrejci, Ramkumar Dhanapal, Reese Enghardt,Krejci"/>, <contact fullname="Ramkumar Dhanapal"/>, <contact fullname="Reese Enghardt"/>, <contact fullname=" ReshadRahman, Rob Wilton, Roman Danyliw, Sandra Murphy,Rahman"/>, <contact fullname="Rob Wilton"/>, <contact fullname="Roman Danyliw"/>, <contact fullname="Sandra Murphy"/>, <contact fullname=" SeanTurner, Tom Petch, Warren Kumari, and Zaheduzzaman Sarker.</t>Turner"/>, <contact fullname="Tom Petch"/>, <contact fullname="Warren Kumari"/>, and <contact fullname="Zaheduzzaman Sarker"/>.</t> </section> </back> </rfc>